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Abstract In this paper we determine the asymptotic behavior of the Non-dictatorship Index
(NDI) introduced in Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi (2019). We show that if m denotes
the number of alternatives, then as the number of voters tends to infinity the NDI of any
anonymous voting rule tends to (m− 1)/m, which equals the NDI of the constant rule.
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1 Introduction
Aggregating preferences of individuals to a collective decision (i.e. alternative), is an open
problem ever since. Besides the axiomatic approach pioneered by Arrow (1951) there is a
fairly large literature initiated by Farkas and Nitzan (1979) and extensively developed by
Elkind et al. (2015) employing optimization techniques in order to determine an ‘optimal’
social choice function. The latter approach takes a distance function and picks for each
profile the alternative chosen by the ‘closest’ profile with a winning alternative determined
by some desirable properties.
In Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi (2017) we considered the distances of social choice
functions from the dictatorial rules. We derived the plurality rule and the reverse-plurality
rule as the solutions of respective optimization problems. By employing the same distance
function we have introduced in Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi (2019) a non-dictatorship
index (NDI). Concerning the celebrated Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (1973/75), the non-
dictatorship index focuses on the part of being non-dictatorial, while the well-known Nitzan–
Kelly-index (1985/88) on non-manipulability. The degree of manipulability of several social
choice rules have been determined by Kelly (1993) and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) via
computational experiments among others.
In this paper we determine for any given number of alternatives and for any anonymous
social choice function the limit of the NDI as the number of voters tends to infinity. Inter-
estingly, for anonymous social choice functions the limit of the NDI equals the NDI of the
constant social choice functions. An analogous convergence result has been established for
the Nitzan-Kelly-index (NKI) for a large class of so-called ‘classical’ social choice functions
by Slinko (2002) stating that for these functions the NKI tends to zero as the number of
voters tends to infinity; however, this is not true for any social choice function (see Pe-
leg, 1971). Thus, concerning the NKI, the classical social choice functions come close to
any dictatorial rule. Regarding a condition and the implication appearing in the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem, the NDI of anonymous social choice functions ‘approaches’ the NDI
of a rule extremely violating the condition imposed on the range of social choice functions
(i.e. their surjectivity), while the NKI of ‘classical’ social choice functions ‘approaches’ the
NKI of the dictatorial rules.
2 The framework
Let A = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of alternatives, where m ≥ 2, and N = {1, . . . , n} be the
set of voters. We shall denote by P the set of all linear orderings (irreflexive, transitive
and total binary relations) on A and by Pn the set of all preference profiles. If ≻∈ Pn and
i ∈ N , then ≻i is the preference ordering of voter i over A.
Definition 1. A mapping f : Pn → A that selects the winning alternative is called a social
choice function (or voting rule), henceforth, SCF.
An SCF f is called anonymous if any reordering of voters’ preferences of an arbitrarily
given preference profile, does not change the alternative selected by f . As our definition
of an SCF does not allow for possible ties, in this event a fixed anonymous1 tie-breaking
rule will be employed. A tie-breaking rule τ : Pn → P maps preference profiles to linear
orderings on A, which will be only employed when a formula does not determine a unique
winner. If there are more alternatives chosen by a formula ‘almost’ specifying an SCF, then
the highest ranked alternative is selected, based on the given tie-breaking rule among tied
alternatives.
Let rk[a,≻] denote the rank of alternative a in the ordering ≻∈ P (i.e. rk[a,≻] = 1 if
a is the top alternative in the ranking ≻, rk[a,≻] = 2 if a is second-best, and so on). A
voting rule PL is the plurality rule if for all (≻i)ni=1 ∈ Pn
PL ((≻i)ni=1) = argτ max
a∈A
# {i ∈ N | rk[a,≻i] = 1} ,
where the index τ of arg indicates that ties will be resolved based on the tie-breaking rule
τ , and PL SC is the respective plurality score
PL SC ((≻i)ni=1) = max
a∈A
# {i ∈ N | rk[a,≻i] = 1} .
PL chooses an alternative that is ranked first by the maximum number of voters.
A voting rule REV PL is the reverse-plurality rule if for all (≻i)ni=1 ∈ Pn
REV PL ((≻i)ni=1) = argτ min
a∈A
# {i ∈ N | rk[a,≻i] = 1} ,
where the index τ of arg indicates that ties will be resolved based on the tie-breaking rule
τ , and REV PL SC is the respective reverse-plurality score
REV PL SC ((≻i)ni=1) = min
a∈A
# {i ∈ N | rk[a,≻i] = 1} .
REV PL chooses an alternative that is ranked first by the minimum number of voters.
Let F = APn be the set of SCFs (i.e. the set of all mappings from Pn to A) and Fan ⊂ F
be the set of anonymous voting rules. The subset of F consisting of the dictatorial rules will
1The linear ordering selected by an anonymous tie-breaking is invariant to the ordering of voters’ prefer-
ences.
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be denoted by D = {d1, . . . , dn}, where di is the dictatorial rule with voter i as the dictator,
that is the SCF selects always the top alternative of voter i. By counting the number of
profiles, on which f and g choose different alternatives we define a metric:
"(f, g) = #{≻∈ Pn|f(≻) ∕= g(≻)} ≤ |Pn| = (m!)n (2.1)
on F = APn .
We define our non-dictatorship index (NDI) by taking the distance to the closest dicta-
torial rule.




Assuming that Pn is a discrete probability space with the uniform distribution, NDI(f)
equals the smallest probability that an alternative equals the top ranked alternative of a
voter.
3 The limit of the NDI
First we start with bounding the NDI based on our results in Bednay, Moskalenko and
Tasnádi (2017) from which it follows that
0 ≤ NDI(PL) ≤ NDI(f) ≤ NDI(REV PL) ≤ 1
for any anonymous SCF f . Hence, restricting ourselves to anonymous SCFs, it is sufficient
to show that NDI(PL) and NDI(REV PL) tend to (m − 1)/m when n tends to infinity
to derive the limiting result for any anonymous f .
Note that for any anonymous SCF f we have "(f, di) = "(f, dj) for any i, j ∈ N , and it












































where 1 denotes the characteristic function, i.e. 1f(≻)=di(≻) = 1 if f(≻) = di(≻), and









We continue with bounding the values of 1nPL SC ((≻i)
n
i=1), where we assume in line
with our simulations in Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi (2019) that the preference relations
of the individuals are generated independently and distributed uniformly above the set of
preference relations P. Since in case of the plurality rule as well as in case of the reverse-
plurality rule only the top-ranked alternatives matter the problem reduces to considering
for each voter the uniform distribution above the set of alternatives A. We shall denote
by X
(n)
i : Pn → {0, 1, . . . , n} the number of top positions of alternative i ∈ A in case of n
voters. Then X
(n)
1 , . . . , X
(n)
m are non-independently binomially distributed with parameter









We shall denote by P the uniform distribution above the discrete probability space Pn.
SinceX
(n)
i is the sum of n independent Bernoulli distributions for any i ∈ A, the Chebyshev’s
inequality, or more precisely the inequality resulting the weak law of large numbers, implies












































from which it follows that Y (n)/n converges in probability to 1/m.
Since PL SC(≻) = Y (n)(≻) for any ≻∈ Pn, we get by employing (3.3) that NDI(PL)
converges in probability to the common mean (m−1)/m as n tends to infinity. In analogous
way we can derive that NDI(REV PL) also converges in probability to (m − 1)/m as n
tends to infinity. Therefore, the limits of all graphs in Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi
(2019) associated with the NDI values of well-known SCFs approach (m− 1)/m as n tends
to infinity. Hence, we have proven the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let the number of alternatives m be fixed. Then for any sequence (fn)
∞
n=1 of








We shall denote by f i one of the m constant SCFs, which assigns to each profile ≻∈ P
alternative i ∈ A, that is f i(≻) = i for all ≻∈ P. Clearly, f i is anonymous and it can be
easily verified that NDI(f i) = (m − 1)/m. Furthermore, we have NDI(di) = 0 for any
dictatorial rule di ∈ D. However, the dictatorial rules are non-anonymous.
As we have already mentioned in the introduction the NKI of classical SCFs tend to
zero. Taking into consideration that the NKIs of dictatorial rules and constant rules are
all zero, we conclude that the NDI can distinguish between these two types of elementary
SCFs (both playing special roles in the statement of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
either implicitly or explicitly), while the NKI and several related indexes on manipulability
cannot, this observation might be considered as a fact in favor of the NDI.
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